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PowERs-ExECUTION BY A GENERAL RESIDUARY CLAUSE-Testatrix
was given a general testamentary power of appointment over the corpus of a
trust by her deceased husband's will. His will further directed that "a general
residuary clause in her will shall not be deemed to be an exercise of said power
of appointment." Plaintiff was named as a taker in ,default of appointment.
The testatrix died eight years later leaving a will which expressly provided that
it was exercising the power of appointment. One paragraph of her will gave
several specific bequests from the said trust estate; the paragraph following provided: "All the rest, residue and remainder of the trust property and estate as to
which I have the power of appointment under the last Will of my husband, •••
I give, devise and bequeath to such of my nieces, as shall survive me." The ne;xt
paragraph disposed of the residue of her own estate. Plaintiff petitioned for a
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.final judicial settlement of the trust estate, claiming the power was not exercised
in the manner provided by the donor. Held, the power was properly exercised.
In re Kilpatrick's Estate, (Mich. 1947) 28 N.W. (2d) 286.
The court felt that the probable intent of the donor in prohibiting an appointment by a general residuary clause, was "to provide against a thoughtless
or inadequ~tely considered :final disposition of ••• property." i Thus it concluded that the testatrix had not attempted to exercise the power by "a general
residuary clause" within the meaning of that phrase as used by the donor.
There seems little doubt but that this decision gave full effect to the donor's
intention. The writer has been unable to :find any cases based on a similar fact
situation. Most of the cases involving the exercise of testamentary powers have
arisen where there has been no such restriction by the donor, and the usual
question is whether the donee has or has not manifested an intent to exercise
the power by his will. 2 In the absence of statute, most states hold that the power
of appointment must be referred to either expressly or impliedly in the will, in
order to indicate an intent to exercise the power.8 In applying this rule these
courts usually apply the arbitrary test whereby .one of the three following elements must be present in the will: (I) reference to the power itself, ( 2) reference to the subject matter of the power, or (3) the provision must be such that
it would otherwise be a nullity unless in exercise of the power.,i, A few cases,
however, although purporting to follow the same rule, have found an intent
to exercise the power from circumstances and language falling outside the scope
of the three above mentioned elements.5 Since the ultimate question in such
cases is the intent of the donee, the reasoning followed in these latter cases
seems desirable. Massachusetts, on the other hand, holds that a general or
,, residuary clause presumptively exercises a general power 6 unless a contrary
· , intent is shown on the face of the will. 7 Many states have enacted statutes which
have in effect codified the Massachusetts view. 8 While these statutes have some
1

Principal case at 288.
l SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 270 (1936), and cases cited.
8
Ibid.
4
Hollister v. Shaw, 46 Conn. 248 (1878); Equitable Trust Co. v. Paschall, 13
Del. Ch. 87, u5 A. 356 (1921); Butler v. Prudden, 182 Ga. 189, 185 S.E. 102
(1936); Standley v. Allen, 349 Mo. u15, 163 S.W. (2d) 1012 (1942).
5
Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 515 (1879); Rettig v. Zander, 364 Ill. u2, 4 N.E.
(2d) 30 (1936); Rice v. Park, 223 Ala. 317, 135 S. 472 (1931); Paul v. Paul, 99
N. J. Eq. 498 (1926).
,,
6
In Worcester Bank and Trust Co. v. Sibley, 287 Mass. 594, 192 N.E. 31
(1934), the court refused to decide specifically whether this presumption also applied
to a special power where the residuary legatees are members of the limited class. See
also Stone v. Forbes, 189 11✓.Iass. 163, 75 N.E. 141 (1905), for dictum to the effect
that the pres1,1,mption does apply to special powers.
7
Harvard Trust Co. v. Frost, 258 Mass. 319, 154 N.E. 863 (1927) (extrinsic
evidence of a contrary intent held inadmissible); Pitma~ v. Pitman, 314 Mass. 465,
50 N.E. (2d) 69 (1943). New Hampshire adopted this view in Emery v. Haven,
67 N.H. 503, 35 A. 940 (1894), but apparently rejected it in the recent case of
Faulkner v. Faulkner, 93 N.H. 451, 44 A. (2d) 429 (1945).
8
Cal. Probate Code (Deering, 1941) § 125; D.C. Code (1940) § 19-203;
Idaho Code·(1932) § 14-325; Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, § 345; Mich. Stat. Ann.
• (1937) § 26.143; Minn. Stat. (1945) § 502.71; Mont. Rev. Code (1935) § 7029;
2
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variations,9 the more common type provides that a general devise or bequest
of the testator's property exercises any power of appointment which the testator
may have, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.10 A few of these
statutes say nothing about "a contrary intention"; u it is believed, however, that
the e:ffect of such statutes is merely to provide a rule of construction and that a
showing of contrary intention on the part of the donee will override that
statutory presumption.12 Under all these statutes the question is presented: what
constitutes " a contrary intention"? While there is no definite standard to serve
as a guide, the relatively few cases in which such contrary intention has been
found indicate that a fairly clear showing is necessary before a court will say
the statutory presumption has been rebutted.18 In the principal case, the court
made no mention of the pertinent statute; 14 however, in view of the specific
directions given by the donor regarding the manner of exercising the power,
40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1938) § 181 and 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1938) § 176; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1943) § 31-43; N.D. Rev. Code (1943)
§ 56-0514; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84 § 164; Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 20,
§ 223; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 566, § 9; S.C. Code (1942) § 8928; S.D. Code
(1939) § 56.0314; Utah Code (1943) 101-2-14; Va. Code (1942) § 5241; W.
Va. Code (1943) § 4057; Wis. Stat. (1945) § 232.51. ,
9
Although most of these statutes expressly refer to both real and personal property,
a few specify only real property. Some refer to "powers to devise" while others specify
"general powers." The Wisconsin statute, cited in note 9 refers to realty only, yet
in Horlick v. Sidley, 241 Wis. 81, 3 N.W. (2d) 710 (1942), the court held that
the policy laid down by the statute as to realty applied also to personalty. In Childs
v. Gross, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 680, 107 P. (2d) 424 (1940), the use of the word
"devise" in the statutory phrase "including property embraced in a power to devise"
was held to apply to personalty as well as realty.
In McLean v. McLean, 174 App. Div. 152, 160 N.Y.S. 949 (1916), the court
held the statute applied to special powers where the residuary legatees were members
of the limited class. Affirmed, 223 N.Y. 695, II9 N.E. 1057 (1918). The same
result was reached in Biddle's Estate, 333 Pa. St. 316, 5 A. (2d) 158 (1939).
10
The Pennsylvania Statute cited in note 9 is typical.
11
California, Montana, North Dakota, and Utah fall in this category.
12
4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 343, comment d (1940).
18
Barton Trust, 348 Pa. St. 279, 35 A. (2d) 266 (1944), where testator had two
powers of appointment. The residuary clause of his will expressly referred to only one
of these powers. Held, the residuary clause executed both powers; Gassinger v. Thillman, 160 Md. 194, 153 A. 19 (1931), where decedent executed his will naming_
his wife as residuary legatee. A few days later he executed deeds conveying leasehold
properties to his wife for life only, reserving full power of disposition in himself. Held,
the subsequent deeds show an intention that the residuary clause was not meant to
exercise the reserved powers. Cf. Lederer v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore,
182 Md. 422, 35 A. (2d) 166 (1943). See also Thomson v. Wanamaker's Trustee,
268 Pa. St. 203, II0 A. 770 (1920); Carraway v. Moseley, 152 N.C. 337 (1910);
U.S. Trust Co. v. Winchester, 277 Ky. 434, 126 S.W. (2d) 814 (1939); Cal. Trust
Co. v. Ott, 59 Cal. App. (2d) 715, 140 P. (2d) 79 (1943); Worcester Bank and
Trust Co. v. Sibley, 287 Mass. 594, 192 N.E. 31 ·(1934) (no statute involved).
14
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 26.143. Lands embraced in a power to devise
shall pass by a will purporting to convey all the real property of the testator unless the
intent that the will shall not operate as an execution of the power shall appear expressly, '
or by necessary implication.
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the court apparently assumed the statute was inapplicable.15 This assumption
certainly seems warranted in view of other Michigan statutes governing the
extent to which a donor can effectively impose formalities on the manner of
exercising a power. These last mentioned statutes indicate that the donor can
impose practically any restriction he wishes with the exceptions noted below.16
Other states have similar statutes,17 and the common law is even more liberal
in giving effect to the donor's directions. 18 Thus it appears that the presumption created by the statutes relating to the exercise of powers by residuary clause
can be evaded by a restriction or direction on the part of the donor, or rebutte1 by an expression of contrary intent by the donee.

John E. Grosboll, S.Ed.

15 Apparently the statute would not have applied in any event unless the corpus
of the trust embraced some real estate.
16 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 26.136. "When the grantor [of a power] shall
have directed any formalities to be used in the execution of a power, in addition to
those which would be sufficient by law to pass the estate, the observance of such additional formalities shall not be necessary to a valid execution of the power."
Id. § 26. I 3 7. ''When the conditions annexed to a power are merely nominal,
and evince no intention of actual benefit to the party to whom, or in whose favor
they are to be performed, they may be wholly disregarded in the execution of the
power."
Id. § 26.138. "With the exceptions contained in the preceeding sections, the
intentions of the grantor of a power, as to the mode, time and conditions of its exe'cution, shall be observed, subject to the power of a court of chancery to supply a
defective execution, in the cases hereinafter provided."
17 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 345 ( I 940) •
18 Montgomery v. The Agricultural Bank, 18 Miss. 566 (1848); Breit v. Yeaton,
IOI Ill. 242 (1882).

